CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1899-1900 OF 2011
MOHAMMED AJMAL MOHAMMAD AMIR KASAB @ ABU MUJAHID … APPELLANT
VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA … RESPONDENT
WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1961 OF 2011
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA … APPELLANT VERSUS FAHIM HARSHAD MOHAMMAD YUSUF ANSARI & ANOTHER … RESPONDENTS
AND TRANSFER PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.30 OF 2012
RADHAKANT YADAV… PETITIONER VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS… RESPONDENTS
Here is an unedited (emphasis is mine) excerpt from the verdict that specifically deals with role of the media during 26/11 Mumbai attacks:
* Start of the excerpt
AN OBITER:
Role of the media:
Role of the media:
402. Before parting with the transcripts, we feel compelled to say a few words about the way the terrorist attacks on Taj Hotel, Hotel Oberoi and Nariman House were covered by the mainstream, electronic media and shown live on the TV screen. From the transcripts, especially those from Taj Hotel and Nariman House, it is evident that the terrorists who were entrenched at those places and more than them, their collaborators across the border were watching the full show on TV. In the transcripts there are many references to the media reports and the visuals being shown on the TV screen. The collaborators sitting in their hideouts across the border came to know about the appellant being caught alive from Indian TV: they came to know about the killing of high ranking police officers also from Indian TV. At one place in the transcript, the collaborators and the terrorists appear to be making fun of the speculative report in the media that the person whose dead body was found in Kuber was the leader of the terrorist group whom his colleagues had killed for some reason before leaving the boat56. At another place in the transcript the collaborators tell the terrorists in Taj Hotel that the dome at the top (of the building) had caught fire. The terrorists holed up in some room were not aware of this. The collaborators further advise the terrorists that the stronger they make the fire the better it would be for them57. At yet another place the terrorists at Hotel Taj tell the collaborators that they had thrown a grenade. The Collaborators reply, “the sound of the grenade has come, they have shown the grenade, the explosion has taken place, people are wounded”58. At yet another place the collaborators tell the terrorists at Hotel Oberoi that the troops were making their position very strong on
56 Nariman House, Talk No. 26 (Ext. no. 990) 57 Hotel Taj, Talk No. 4 (Ext. no. 971) 58 Hotel Taj, Talk No. 8 (Ext. No. 972)
the roof of the building59. At yet another place the collaborators tell the terrorists at Taj Hotel the exact position taken by the policemen (close to a building that belonged to the navy but was given to the civilians) and from where they were taking aim and firing at them (the terrorists) and advised them the best position for them to hit back at those policemen.60 There are countless such instances to show that the collaborators were watching practically every movement of the security forces that were trying to tackle the terrorists under relentless gun fire and throwing of grenades from their end.
403. Apart from the transcripts, we can take judicial notice of the fact that the terrorists attacks at all the places, in the goriest details, were shown live on the Indian TV from beginning to end almost non-stop. All the channels were competing with each other in showing the latest developments on a minute to minute basis, including the positions and the movements of the security forces engaged in flushing out the terrorists. The reckless coverage of the terrorist attack by the channels thus gave rise to a situation where on the one hand the terrorists were completely hidden from the security forces and they had no means to know their exact position or even the kind of firearms and explosives they possessed and on the other hand the positions of the security forces, their weapons and all their operational movements were being watched by the collaborators across the border
on TV screens and being communicated to the terrorists.
59 Hotel Oberoi, Talk No. 4 (Ext. no. 979) 60 Hotel Taj, Talk No. 3 (Ext. No. 970)
404. In these appeals, it is not possible to find out whether the security forces actually suffered any casualty or injuries on account of the way their operations were being displayed on the TV screen. But it is beyond doubt that the way their operations were freely shown made the task of the security forces not only exceedingly difficult but also dangerous and risky.
405. Any attempt to justify the conduct of the TV channels by citing the right to freedom of speech and expression would be totally wrong and unacceptable in such a situation. The freedom of expression, like all other freedoms under Article 19, is subject to reasonable restrictions. An action tending to violate another person’s right to life guaranteed under Article 21 or putting the national security in jeopardy can never be justified by taking the plea of freedom of speech and expression.
406. The shots and visuals that were shown live by the TV channels could have also been shown after all the terrorists were neutralized and the security operations were over. But, in that case the TV programmes would not have had the same shrill, scintillating and chilling effect and would not have shot up the TRP ratings of the channels. It must, therefore, be held that by covering live the terrorists attack on Mumbai in the way it was done, the Indian TV channels were not serving any national interest or social cause. On the contrary they were acting in their own commercial interests putting the national security in jeopardy.
407. It is in such extreme cases that the credibility of an institution is tested. The coverage of the Mumbai terror attack by the mainstream electronic media has done much harm to the argument that any regulatory mechanism for the media must only come from within.
* End of the excerpt
Complete Supreme Court verdict is available at: Supreme Court Verdict - August 29, 2012
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